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Smart contracts are new computational units with special properties: they act as classes with aspectual
concerns; their memory structure is more complex than mere objects; they are obscure in the sense that
once deployed it is difficult to access their internal state; they reside in an append-only chain. There is
a need to support the building of new generation tools to help developers. Such support should tackle
several important aspects: (1) the static structure of the contract, (2) the object nature of published
contracts, and (3) the overall data chain composed of blocks and transactions. In this chapter, we
present SmartAnvil an open platform to build software analysis tools around smart contracts. We il-
lustrate the general components and we focus on three important aspects: support for static analysis of
Solidity smart contracts, deployed smart contract binary analysis through inspection, and blockchain
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navigation and querying. SmartAnvil is open-source and supports a bridge to the Moose data and
software analysis platform.
1.1 Relevance: the need to support tool building
Solidity’s smart contracts are new computational units with special properties [Eth18c]: they act as
classes with aspectual concerns; they respond to message calls as a remote object; their memory
structure is more complex than that of mere objects; they are obscure in the sense that once deployed
it is difficult to access their internal state; and, they reside in an append-only chain.
There is a large spectrum of possible analyses that smart contracts could benefit from [DMO+18].
Some have already been proposed in the literature and others not yet. Here is an non exhaustive
list: attack analysis [LCO+16, ABC17], general metric [TDMO18] and dedicated smart contract
metrics analysis, gas consumption optimization [CLLZ17], gas cost prediction, dashboard [Few06],
or contract visualisation [ABC+13] to name a few.
There is a need to support the building of new generation tools to help developers [DMO+18].
Such support should tackle several important aspects taking into account the specificities of Smart
Contracts: (1) the general structure and semantics of contracts, (2) the object nature of published
contracts, and (3) the overall chain composed of block and transactions. Several analysis tools exist
such as Oyente [LCO+16], BlockSci [KGC+17], and others [BLPB17, BDLF+16, Eth18b] but to
the best of our knowledge they focus on a single aspect of smart contracts either static analysis or
collecting mere data.
In this chapter, we present SmartAnvil an open platform to build software analysis tools around
various aspects of smart contracts. We illustrate the general components and we focus on three im-
portant aspects: support for static analysis of Solidity smart contracts, deployed smart contract binary
analysis, and blockchain navigation and query. SmartAnvil is open-source and supports a bridge to
the Moose data and software analysis platform.
The contributions of this article are the descriptions of several components that compose Smar-
tAnvil open-source platform. The outline of the article is the following: Section 1.2 describes the
general architecture and components of the platform. Section 1.3 describes the low-level components
for static analysis. Section 1.4 describes the low-level components to interact and analyze deployed
contracts. Section 1.5 describes blockchain navigation and query support. Section 1.6 discuss the
future extensions on the platform and also presents the related work on blockchain analysis platforms.
Finally, in Section 1.7, we make our final remarks and conclusions.
1.2 SmartAnvil: Open Platform Architecture
The SmartAnvil open platform is structured around several components to cover the different aspects
of smart contract analysis. Figure 1.1 shows the key elements that we describe in the following. While
SmartAnvil can work in isolation, SmartAnvil interacts with the Moose data and software analysis
platform [NA05].















Figure 1.1: SmartAnvil components
1.2.1 Solidity Structural Components
Parser/AST (SmaccSol). The first basic but important component for static analysis is a parser/AST.
The component SmaccSol offers a full parser and AST model for Solidity. It is based on the
Smacc Compiler-Compiler framework [LBGD18, BGLD17]. This parser corrected early gram-
mar errors of the Solidity language [RDDL17].
Graph (SmartGraph). Based on SmaccSol, the SmartGraph component builds a semantic tree,
where it enforces the rules that cannot be defined in syntax level. It also defines scopes allow-
ing one to easily lookup reified components, such as methods, types, parameters, arguments,
contracts, etc. It supports powerful analyses and graph-like navigations by using simple queries
over the tree. This component allows one to easily do static annotations or to build call-graphs.
Software Metrics (SmartMetrics). This component mixes the information provided by the previous
components and the information provided by the Fog components supporting deployed contract
analyses to offer a large set of metrics characterizing both the solidity code and the deployed
contracts.
1.2.2 Deployed Contract Components
The other set of components provide libraries to reverse engineer deployed contracts.
Drivers and Access to Contracts (Fog Comm). This component supports the access to the GETH-
RPC API, implementing the primitives and related type marshaling for accessing deployed
contracts, transactions, blocks, and more [BRDD18b].
Blockchain element reification (Fog Live). This component extends FogComm by adding first cit-
izen representations for blocks, transactions, external/internal accounts. It provides as well as
contract mirrors and contract proxies – built by techniques of reverse engineering and Smacc-
Sol’s AST analysis –, for allowing a powerful connection to deployed contracts. It also provides
the idea of Sessions, allowing cached and uncached interaction with the blockchain.
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SmartInspect. This component leverages the implementation of contracts and mirrors in FogLive
for gathering information. It exposes a contract’s data in different formats to let the programmer
access fine-grained information about the values of variables for a given deployed contract. It
lets the developers inspect all the aspects of a deployed contract [BRDD18b].
Bytecode Reverse Engineering (Fog EVM ByteCode). This component extracts and interprets the
stored hexadecimal code in deployed contracts building a representation of the instructions and
the relative memory layout. It also allows one to stream instructions and cut the contents into
smaller pieces as, lookup, methods, branching points etc. It complements the SmartGraph and
SmaccSol AST. This low-level information is interesting for fine-grained low-level analyses,
for example, gas consumption analysis.
1.2.3 Transaction Navigation
Query and Navigation (Ukulele). This component offers a query language to navigate and access
transactions and deployed contracts. To achieve this, it implements different indexing strategies
based on map reduce technologies and it leverages the mirrors developed in FogLive. It has a
small IDE to manipulate identified entities [BRDD18a].
1.3 Foundation for Smart Contract Static Analysis
Solidity [Eth18c] is a programming language used to specify smart contracts on the blockchain
platforms and in particular Ethereum [Eth14]. Solidity was originally designed to be the primary
smart contract language for Ethereum. Even though other contract languages have been created for
Ethereum (e.g., Serpent, LLL), Solidity is still one of the major ones. Moreover, Solidity can also
be used in other blockchain platforms such as Tendermint, Hyperledger Burrow, and Counterparty.
Probably because of its popularity, a great amount of smart contract research deals with Solidity.
Therefore, any proposed tool handling smart contracts should support Solidity to be well received.
Usually, static analysis is employed to examine programming language artifacts. Since Solidity
is a programming language and smart contracts are its artifacts, we use static analysis techniques to
implement tools for contract understanding and analyses [CCI90]. At their basis, most static analysis
foundation techniques rely on ASTs (Abstract Syntax Tree). For instance, it is much easier to create
code inspection tools on top of an AST than to rely on the purely textual contents of a contract.
Therefore, to build static analyses for Solidity contracts, we need a way to create ASTs. Consequently,
we require a parser to read Solidity source code and output a relevant AST representation of it.
In addition, we need a separate infrastructure from the Solidity compiler for the following reasons:
1. since the Parser and AST represent a foundational part of a strong analysis tool, we need to
fully control the parser and its production to avoid unwanted side effect in analyses using the
produced ASTs;
2. since the shape of the produced ASTs can severely impact the complexity of the analysis build
on top, we need to control our ASTs.
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Working with JSON AST produced by the Solidity compiler did not match the above require-
ments. In addition, we wanted to integrate with Moose (a data and software analysis platform) because
it provides a rich and versatile set of tools [NA05] with a large ecosystems [Ber16, LKG07]. There-
fore, developing a Solidity parser improves the support for better code analysis in Solidity [RDDL17].
To accomplish this, we used SmaCC (Smalltalk Compiler-Compiler) [BLGD17] relying on an adapted
grammar specification of the Solidity language.
1.3.1 Challenges
The main challenge of designing a parser for Solidity is the inconsistencies among the documenta-
tion [Eth18c]. For example, in one part of the documentation it is stated that string literals are enclosed
by either single or double-quotes (section “Solidity in Depth” - “Types” - “String Literal”). However,
in another part (section “Miscellaneous” - “Language Grammar”) only double-quotes are supported to
define string literals. On the other hand, the official parser recognizes both single and double-quoted
string literals. This is just one example of several inconsistencies we found [RDDL17]. We decided
to follow the official parser, i.e., if something is parseable in the official parser then our parser should
understand it as well. Even so, the inconsistencies in the documentation made the parser creation
much more difficult because we lacked a reliable specification to follow.
Another challenge to create a parser is how often the Solidity language changes. The language
specification is not stable and syntactic rules are added or changed to support new versions of Solidity.
For example, in version 0.4.21 (and below), there was no syntactic rule to handle a constructor, they
were just a function definition with the same name as the contract. But that changed in version
0.4.22 (and above), where the constructor has a distinct syntax different from function (by using the
constructor keyword). Therefore, any parser for Solidity needs to adapt to changes in the syntax as
the language is still under development.
We took into account these challenges when designing and developing our Solidity parser for
Pharo.
1.3.2 Approach: SmaCC-Solidity
Creating a parser can be a difficult and time-consuming endeavor. Parser generators provide an easier
way to tackle this problem [IM15]. Basically, we write the syntax specification using a formal gram-
mar and the generator automatically builds the parser. For example, there are many parser generation
tools available nowadays such as YACC [Mer93], ANTLR [Mil05], and SmaCC [BLGD17].
Generally, we can classify a parser as either top-down or bottom-up. A top-down parser starts
its productions from the root element of the grammar working its way down to the bottom leaves. A
bottom-up parser works vice-versa, starting from the leaves and working up to the root. Moreover,
either type of parser usually works on a subclass of grammars. The most common subclasses are
LL(k) for top-down, and LR(k) for bottom-up parsers [ALSU06].
When we consider the Pharo Smalltalk environment, there are two prominent parser generation
tools: PetitParser [KLR13], and SmaCC [BLGD17]. Therefore, we had these two options to create our
parser. We could also write the parser ourselves without relying on generators. We chose to develop
our parser using SmaCC for the following reasons: (i) SmaCC requires a textual context-free grammar
6CHAPTER 1. SMARTANVIL: OPEN-SOURCE TOOL SUITE FOR SMART CONTRACT ANALYSIS
as input that is similar to the grammar provided for Solidity; (ii) SmaCC generated parser can adapt
more easily to future changes in the Solidity grammar; and (iii) SmaCC produces an LR parser, which
has interesting advantages over other types of parsers [ALSU06]. Moreover, both PetitParser and a
manually written parser would be more difficult to adapt and maintain than SmaCC. Therefore, we
claim that SmaCC is the better option to create our parser.
The SmaCC-Solidity parser is publicly available in GitHub (github.com/smartanvil/SmaCC-Solidity).
1.3.3 Illustrative Example
Usually, someone uses a parser when he/she needs to perform static analysis on the source code.
Let’s suppose a developer who wants to create a Token contract. Roughly speaking, a token is
a custom form of cryptocurrency managed by a contract. A token could represent loyalty points,
bonds, game items, etc. In this scenario, the developer wants to first understand a well-used to-
ken before coding his own. In this example, the developer gets the GolemNetworkToken (address:
0xa74476443119A942dE498590Fe1f2454d7D4aC0d) contract code and decides to build a visual rep-
resentation of it. By using our parser and some classes from the Roassal package [Ber16], a few lines
of code (Listing 1.1) is all it needs to build a simple visualization.
Listing 1.1: Visualization using SmaCC-Solidity
1 ast := SolidityParser parse: sourcecode.
2 b := RTMondrian new.
3 b nodes: (ast sourceunits) forEach: [ :contract |
4 (contract className = ’SolContractDefinitionNode’)
5 ifTrue: [ b shape box color: Color blue.
6 b nodes: (contract statements select:
7 [ :stt | stt className = ’SolStateVariableDefinition’] ).
8 b shape box color: Color gray; size: [ :f | f source lines size * 3].
9 b nodes: (contract statements select:
10 [ :stt | stt className = ’SolFunctionDefinitionNode’]).
11 b layout flow ] ].
12 b.
In Listing 1.1, first we get the AST from parsing source code (line 1). Then, we create a new
Roassal visualization [ABC+13] where each contract is a big gray box (lines 2-4). Inside each contract
box, we get the state variable definitions (i.e., contract attributes) and create blue boxes representing
it (lines 5-7). Moreover, for each function, we also create a gray box inside the contract, and the
size of the function is related to its lines of code (lines 8-10). Finally, we define a standard layout
for the visualization (line 11) and “return” the visualization object for show (line 12). The resulting
visualization shows each contract on a big box, with smaller boxes inside representing attributes (in
blue) and functions (Figure 1.2).
1.3.4 Evaluation
For comparison, we verified if our parser could recognize the same Solidity contracts as the official
parser. It is reasonable to assume that the official parser is the correct implementation. Therefore, any
contract parsed by the official should also be supported by our implementation. We used Etherscan to
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Figure 1.2: Contract Functions using SmaCC-Solidity
access Solidity contracts that were publicly available with its source code. All such contracts were cor-
rectly recognized by the official parser. Therefore, our evaluation was to verify if our implementation
could parse them as well.
At the time of the experiment (August 2017), Etherscan had approximately 2.7K verified contracts
in its database (in August 2018, the number of contracts was more than 40K). From those 2.7K, we
selected only unique contracts from Solidity version 0.4.x for a total of 1,175 contracts. Our imple-
mentation successfully parsed all 1,175 contracts. Consequently, we can claim our parser recognizes
the same language artifacts as the official one.
1.3.5 Related Work
We selected related work from two main topics: parsing conflicts and parser generators.
Isradisaikul and Myers [IM15] describe the difficulty in solving grammar conflicts with LALR
parser generators. They propose an algorithm that generates better counterexamples for LALR parsers.
A counterexample shows a parsing scenario that causes an ambiguity conflict in the LR method. Such
scenarios help developers diagnose the conflict’s source and identify problems in the grammar speci-
fication. The authors implemented their algorithm in Java as an extension to the CUP parser generator
and they also evaluated their approach in 20 grammars against a state-of-the-art ambiguity detector.
Their algorithm usually finds more counterexamples in less time than the compared techniques.
Passos et al. [PBB07] proposes a methodology to resolve conflicts in the LALR parsing method.
The authors describe the challenges for handling conflicts without changing the defined language.
They used YACC to generate a parser for the Notus language to illustrate the difficulty to resolve
conflicts for LALR(1). The authors created a tool, called SAIDE, based on their methodology which
is an improvement over the regular methods available to handle conflicts in LALR parsers.
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We are going to give a brief analysis of some well-known parser generation tools. SmaCC
[BLGD17] is the parser generation tool we chose for this research. SmaCC can generate either LR(1)
or LALR(1) bottom-up parsers. YACC [Mer93] is also a bottom-up LALR(1) parser generator. The
original YACC was developed in C for Unix systems, but now we have implementations of it on sev-
eral other languages. ANTLR [Mil05] differs from the previous tools because it is a top-down parser
generator. ANTLR creates predictive LL(k) parsers, which are less sensitive to grammar irregularities
than LR(1) and LL(1) parsers. There are implementations of ANTLR for languages such as Java,
C++, C#, JavaScript, Python, and others. Unfortunately, as far as we know, there is no implementa-
tion of ANTLR for Pharo. Finally, PetitParser [KLR13] is a scannerless parser generator that relies on
parsing expression grammars. PetitParser is integrated with Moose, which facilitates its use on Pharo.
The main problem with PetitParser is it does not read a grammar specification, and we must write the
grammatic expressions using the PetitParser language.
1.4 Deployed Smart Contract Analysis: Inspection
Opaqueness is the major issue to analyze contract data [BRDD18b]. Smart contracts are opaque in the
sense that once deployed in the blockchain it is very difficult to verify their internal state at run-time
(i.e., the state stored in the contract defined by its internal attributes). By contrast, nowadays any
programming language offers simpler ways to inspect object data. Developers use such inspection
to access run-time data during development or maintenance activities. Similarly, developers could
benefit from smart contract run-time inspection to verify the currently stored data. Moreover, from a
business perspective, companies could use contract inspection to help clients verify and understand
the information that is actually stored in the contract.
The difficulty to inspect contract data is not a widely known problem [BRDD18b]. Nowadays, we
have few tools to inspect contract information. Alternatively, developers resort to other practices to
acquire a contract’s internal state such as creating getter functions to access data. For this reason, it is
important to be able to develop tools that can be used for inspecting internal attributes. Moreover, the
general concern is that a developer should be able to see the values stored in his own contracts.
Therefore, in this context, inspecting contract attributes is not only important but necessary for
developers working with smart contracts.
1.4.1 Challenges
There are many challenges to pierce through the opaqueness problem and reveal contract information.
• Binary and incomplete specification. From the technical aspects, we only have the Ethereum
API to access a binary representation of the contract. The first challenge we faced is an incom-
plete specification of the contract encoding performed by the Solidity compiler [Eth18c].
• Inconsistent specification of hash computation. Another challenge related to the specification
is the hash computation for dynamic types. Static types use text as input for the hash calcula-
tion. However, dynamic types follow a different standard that it is not clearly specified in the
documentation. For dynamic types, it is necessary to use binary data packed specifically for
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each type. For example, to access an array it is necessary to pack the index number and the
array position (offset) into a binary representation to obtain the correct hash. Other dynamic
types would require a different input to get its hash.
• Packed and ordered data. We also highlight the challenges on decoding types, as the compiler
packs as much data as possible into contiguous memory. Therefore, we need to know the
specific types in the correct order to acquire the contract data, and that is not an easy task when
we have an incomplete specification.
We acknowledge as a problem the challenges and difficulties of analyzing our own contracts
deployed in the Ethereum blockchain database. To solve this problem we propose an inspector that
allows the user to perceive a clean representation of the instance’s data attributes. Such inspector is
built using several components of the platform: FogComm, FogLive.
1.4.2 Approach: SmartInspect
SmartInspect [BRDD18a] is an internal state inspector for Solidity contracts based on pluggable
mirror-based reflection system. The goal of this tool is to allow the inspection of known contract
instances based on their source code. The binary structure of the deployed contract is decompiled us-
ing a memory layout reification built from its source code. Therefore, only people with access to the
source code and its deployed binary representation will be able to inspect its internal attributes. More-
over, SmartInspect approach can introspect the current state of a smart contract instance without the
need to redeploy it nor develop additional code for decoding. SmartInspect is implemented in Pharo
and it is publicly available in GitHub as part of the SmartAnvil tool suite (github.com/RMODINRIA-
Blockchain/SmartShackle).
Contract DummyExample {






    int128 integer1;
    int128 integer2;
uint largeint1; 
















    int128 integer1;
    int128 integer2;
uint64 int3; 












Figure 1.3: Memory Layout Representation
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The general idea of the Smart Inspector is to decompile the storage layout encoded by the Ethereum
API. By using the contract source code as reference, it is possible to know where the attribute values
are stored in the encoded binary structure (Figure 1.3). It was a challenge to decompile the mem-
ory layout because the Solidity documentation [Eth18c] is incomplete regarding how some types are
encoded. Therefore, we had to reverse engineer some of the encoding performed by the compiler
ourselves.
After we decoded the memory layout, we still needed to apply our solution to any contract for
a general reusable solution. We employ a mirror-based architecture[BU04] that mimics the structure
of any contract for us to access the memory layout that we can decode. A mirror works like an
independent meta-programming layer which splits the concern of reflection capabilities into a mirror
object. First, we require the contract source code as input to start building the mirror. Then, we parse
the source code (using our Solidity Parser described earlier) to create an AST (Abstract Syntax Tree).
By interpreting the AST, we are able to discover every type declared in the contract in the correct order.
We require this information to decoded the memory layout and access the contract data. Aiming at a
general solution, we model configurable mirror objects that allow us to interact with deployed contract
instances of the same configuration (usually meaning the same contract deployed in the blockchain).
Figure 1.4 shows a diagram of the whole process to inspect a contract, the pluggable reflective
architecture generates a mirror for a given contract’s source code by using its AST (Abstract Syntax
Tree). Then, we use this mirror to extract information from a remote contract instance deployed in the
blockchain (which is encoded as a binary memory layout). The contract data we gathered is exposed


































Figure 1.4: SmartInspect building process.
This approach allows us to access remote structureless information in a structured way. Our
solution meets most of the desirable properties that are important for remote inspection namely: in-
teractiveness and distribution [PBD+15].
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1.4.3 Illustrative Example
We now present an example of a smart contract written in Solidity and SmartInspect introspecting its
contents. Let’s suppose a scenario where a supervisor manages a poll that users are allowed to vote
one single time. The poll is coded into a smart contract because it is used for management decisions
that rely on the veracity and immutability of the information. Only the contract’s supervisor is allowed
to modify the list of voters. The following listing highlights the most important code parts for this
contract:
Listing 1.2: Solidity Poll Contract Example
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
2 /** @title Poll Contract Example
3 * @author RMoD-Blockchain Team
4 */
5 contract RmodPoll {
6 /* Type Definition */
7 enum Choice { POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, NEUTRAL }
8 struct PollEntry { address user; Choice choice; bool hasVoted; }
9
10 /* Attributes / Internal State */
11 PollEntry[] pollTable;
12 address private supervisor;
13
14 /* Constructor */
15 constructor() public{ supervisor = msg.sender; }
16
17 /* Functions */
18 // Add the account as a voter in this poll
19 function addVoter(address account) public returns(uint){ ... }
20 // Verifies if the account is already registered in this poll
21 function isRegistered(address account) public view returns(bool){ ... }
22 // Returns the Voter’s index in the pollTable
23 function voterIndex(address voterAccount) private view returns(int){ ... }
24 // Function called by the voter to assert his vote
25 function vote(Choice myChoice) public { ... }
26 // Verifies if everyone registered for this poll have voted
27 function everyoneHaveVoted() public view returns (bool){ ... }
28 // Return the amount of votes for Positive, Negative, and Neutral
29 function countVotes() public view returns (uint,uint,uint){ ... }
30 }
This contract defines two custom types: Choice (line 5) and PollEntry (line 6). A Choice models
the answers to the poll (whether the vote was positive, negative, or neutral). A PollEntry is a record
representing a vote, i.e., the voting user, the selected option, and if he/she has voted or not. Note
that to refer to the voter we need an account address (using the primitive type address) that refers
to an Ethereum account. The contract stores internally a poll table (an array of PollEntry, line 9)
and an address to the poll’s supervisor account (line 10). The poll table is an empty array where the
supervisor will eventually store the poll information (i.e., the array will have an entry for each user
that is allowed to vote). The supervisor’s address is used for security checks, i.e., to ensure that only
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the supervisor can call some specific functions (e.g., addVoter function). It is not necessary to define
and explain the remaining functions for this illustrative example.
Let’s suppose that the poll needs to be closed soon and not everyone has voted. Therefore, the
poll’s supervisor will need to send reminders to the users who haven’t voted yet. However, the con-
tract’s attributes were not defined as public. Moreover, we did not create any function to check for
that information before deploying the contract. Since we cannot update the source code of a deployed
contract instance, inspecting its internal state is the only way to know the accounts that have not voted.
Because the supervisor has access to both the contract’s source code and its deployed instance, he/she
can execute SmartInspect to see the contract’s data (Figure 1.5). Finally, the supervisor can see which
users did not vote for this current poll instance.
Figure 1.5: SmartInspect Pharo User Interface Screenshot
1.4.4 Evaluation
We investigate whether SmartInspect implements the necessary and desirable features when compared
to other inspectors. We identified six characteristics that are important for a blockchain remote inspec-
tor: Privacy, Extendability, Pluggability, Consistency, Reusability, and Instrumentation. We detail the
characteristics as follows:
• Privacy: inspection should not breach or compromise data privacy by exposing data to unau-
thorized users. When considering smart contracts, a lack of privacy is dangerous as it could be
exploited by malicious users to acquire illicit advantages and resources.
• Extendability: the inspector can be extended for other technologies. Ideally, a debugger or
inspector should rely on a middleware that is extensible. For smart contracts, the inspector
should be extensible over different smart contract languages and blockchain technologies.
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• Pluggability: the inspector can be used on existing objects without the need to re-instantiate
the objects or the system. For contracts, this means we can inspect existing deployed contracts
without any dependency on the contract side, or the need to redeploy the contract. An unplug-
gable approach has the disadvantage of requiring the redeployment of a contract, which has
non-trivial transactional costs.
• Consistency: the representation used by the inspector must reveal the information in a consis-
tent manner, i.e., the inspection must reflect the current state of the deployed contract.
• Reusability: the inspector can be reused for different contracts. Lack of reusability would
require a developer to spend time redefining the inspection for each individual contract.
• Instrumentation: the inspector can alter the semantics of a process to assist in debugging. Ba-
sically, this is the mechanism to halt the process and inspect it at that point (e.g., breakpoints and
watchpoints). This characteristic is not possible in blockchain platforms, as we cannot modify
the deployed contract code to halt a function in the middle of its execution in the blockchain.
We analyzed SmartInspect and two other inspectors (Remix and Etherscan) according to the afore-
mentioned characteristics for inspectors. We also compared two practices for accessing contract data:
ad-hoc Decoder, and Getter methods (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Related techniques comparison
Characteristic SmartInspect Remix Etherscan Decoder Getter
Privacy Yes Yes No Yes No
Extendability Yes No No No No
Pluggability Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Consistency Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reusability Yes Yes Yes No No
Instrumentation No No No No No
As we can see from Table 1.1, SmartInspect’s only characteristic flaw is related to instrumentation
for remote debugging. However, this is a limitation imposed by the Ethereum blockchain technology
rather than a design flaw in our approach.
Remix [Eth18b] is a suite of tools designed by the Ethereum Foundation for Solidity develop-
ers. Remix IDE is probably the most used tool in its suite. In the Remix tool suite, there is a full
transaction debugger with inspection capabilities. Remix inspector only falls short in extendability
and instrumentation. It was designed specifically for Solidity and Ethereum, and as such, it is not
extensible to other platforms. As we previously explained, instrumentation is not possible due to the
characteristics of the Ethereum platform.
Etherscan is an analytics platform for Ethereum. It provides live information from Ethereum on
blocks, transactions, contracts, etc. If a developer publishes his/her contract source code on Etherscan,
then it will be possible to inspect the contract’s data. However, by doing so the developer will expose
his contract source code and internal data to anyone, in a very easy way to access it. That is the reason
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why Etherscan inspection lacks privacy (unlike SmartInspect and Remix which can expose the data
to the developer only). Etherscan provides an API to access its services, but it is not extensible. Just
like SmartInspect and Remix, Etherscan’s inspector cannot support instrumentation.
An ad hoc Decoder uses the Ethereum API on the memory slots to manually fetch the data. This
is a complex task since it demands a deep understanding of the memory layout of each contract a
developer plans to inspect. It also requires a developer to know the type of each attribute and code the
ad-hoc decoder accordingly. Its advantages are that it allows access to data without loss of privacy
and without the need to redeploy the contract. In fact, SmartInspect uses this concept of decoding
memory layouts as a part of its inspection process.
Getter methods are a simple solution since they are cheap to implement and easy to test. The
developer does not need to know the memory layout of a contract to create getter methods. However,
if the developer forgets to make a getter for a given attribute, he/she will need to re-deploy the contract
and, most often, lose the data from the previous instance. Solidity does not support the return of many
complex types (e.g, structs, mappings) on its functions. Therefore, a developer might need to adapt
his/her data or function to provide access to a complex type. Moreover, the easy access to the data
may cause a loss of privacy, since getter methods are a public part of the contract binary encoding.
1.4.5 Related Work
Chis et al. [CNSG15] performed an exploratory research to better understand what developers expect
from object inspectors, and based on that feedback they propose a novel inspector model. The au-
thors interviewed 16 developers for a qualitative study, and a quantitative study conducting an online
survey where 62 people responded. Both studies were used to identify four requirements needed in
an inspector. Then they propose the Moldable Inspector, which indicates a new model to address
multiple types of inspection needs. We followed the lessons taken by the Moldable Inspector when
creating SmartInspect. We deem noteworthy the multiple views aspect, as SmartInspect can present
its inspected data in four different views (REST, Pharo U.I., JSON, and HTML).
Papoulias [PBD+15] gives a deep analysis of remote debugging. As discussed by the author,
remote debugging is especially important for devices that cannot support local development tools. The
author identifies four important characteristics for remote debugging: interactiveness, instrumentation,
distribution, and security. Based on the identified properties, Papoulias proposed a remote debugging
model, called Mercury. Mercury employs a mirror-based approach and an adaptable middleware. We
used Papoulias research as an inspiration to create SmartInspect, especially relying on a mirror for
remote inspection.
Salvaneschi and Mezini [SM16] propose a methodology, called RP Debugging, to debug reactive
programs more effectively. The authors discuss that reactive programming is more customizable and
easier to understand than its alternative the observer design pattern. The authors also present the main
problems and challenges to debug reactive programs, and the main design decisions when creating
their methodology. Although our inspector is from a different application domain, the RP Debugging
design served as an inspiration to plan our own inspecting approach.
Srinivasan and Reps [SR14] developed a reverse engineering tool to recover class hierarchical in-
formation from a binary program file. Their tool also extracts composition relationships as well. They
use dynamic analysis to obtain object traces and then they identify the inheritance and composition
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information among classes on those traces. The authors’ experiments show that their recovered infor-
mation is accurate according to their metrics. The author’s tool contrasts with SmartInspect as we use
static analysis and they use dynamic analysis.
1.5 Chain Navigation and Query Language
Ethereum and other blockchains store a massive amount of heterogeneous data. In early 2017,
Ethereum was estimated to have approximately 300GB of data [BLPB17]. Retrieving information
from this massive data is not an easy task. Moreover, the Ethereum platform only allows direct access
to its first-class data elements, which includes blocks, transactions, accounts, and contracts [Eth14].
Therefore, if we search for a particular information inside a data element, we would need a unique
identifier (i.e., either the number or its hash) to access the block containing such information. An-
other alternative would be to direct access one block and sequentially access its parents to search for
a data. Moreover, the information returned by the Ethereum platform when we access its blocks is
encoded into a JSON-like structure that we need to interpret to acquire a specific item. Therefore,
the Ethereum platform does not provide a semantic way to search for information and neither an easy
form to present such information.
In a classical database, when we need to search for a particular information, we usually write
a query to fetch, present, filter, and format such information. Database query languages like SQL
provide a rich syntax to describe the data we want to acquire from the database. Since blockchain can
be considered a database, it would be better if we could use a similar way to fetch information inside
the blocks. In this context, users could benefit from a query language providing an easier way to fetch,
format, and present the information extract from the blockchain platform.
1.5.1 Challenges
In this section, we describe in more detail the challenges when trying to acquire data from a blockchain.
Although our research is focused on Ethereum, such problems are also present on other blockchain
platforms as well.
• Massive Data. Blockchain databases already possess a massive amount of data. In December
2017, Ethereum processed, on average, 876K transactions per day [BRDD18a]. Since the data
in the blockchain cannot be deleted, the number of recorded transactions will only grow in time.
Consequently, older information could get overwhelmed by new transactions and become “lost
in time”.
• Heterogeneous Data. Blockchain not only stores a great amount of data but also manages
a mixture of first-class elements such as transactions, blocks, accounts, and smart contracts.
All of the first-class elements are different but interrelated by hashes. Even though Ethereum
allows access to any of its first-class elements, the heterogeneity of the elements (each one with
different meaning and high-level representation) complicates the acquisition of information.
• Data Opaqueness. For flexibility reasons, Ethereum stores its information using a generic
representation. Therefore, the stored data is opaque, since there is no meta-data describing the
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information and neither a simple way to know what was recorded. This opaqueness is useful
and even necessary from the Ethereum standpoint because it allows the storage of arbitrary
structures and behaviors. On the other hand, the opaqueness over-complicates searching for
information, since a user needs to access generic representations without any knowledge of its
content.
• Direct Access. In general, blockchain only allows direct access to its elements by using a
unique identifier. This identifier is a hash number that is generated for every first-class element
stored in the blockchain [Bit18]. The Ethereum platform, in particular, can also use a unique
number (related to the order of the element) to access blocks and transactions [Eth18a]. The
direct access complicates the user task in finding information because he will either need to: (i)
store the identifiers for later usage, or (ii) perform a sequential access to gather the data.
To address these challenges, we proposed a query language that enables its users to acquire infor-
mation more easily. We highlight the following benefits of using a query language to fetch information
from blockchain: (i) describe structural and semantic filters to query for information; (ii) reformat and
transform the acquired data; (iii) order the query results; (iv) limit the number of results returned.
1.5.2 Approach: Ukulele
In this section, we present the Ukulele version 0.9, a query language designed to acquire information
from the blockchain. Ukulele is the improvement of our previous work called Ethereum Query Lan-
guage (EQL) [BRDD18a]. Ukulele is publicly available at GitHub as part of the SmartAnvil suite
(https://github.com/smartanvil/UQLL). Ukulele syntax is based on the SQL language. The idea is to
allow users to write queries as close to SQL as possible to facilitate the adoption of Ukulele since
SQL is a very popular language [SKS11, EN10].
Listing 1.3 shows the main elements of the Ukulele syntax. The syntax is described using EBNF
(Extended Backus-Naur Form), we did not format the terminals identifier and number in double-
quotes to highlight that they are not literals. We omitted the Expression rule to not clutter the specifi-
cation, but it follows a similar structure of SQL expressions.
Listing 1.3: Ukulele Grammar in EBNF format
1 <SelectStatement> ::= <SelectClause> <FromClause>
2 [<WhereClause>] [<OrderByClause>] [<LimitClause>]
3 <SelectClause> ::= "select" <Expression> {"," <Expression> }
4 <FromClause> ::= "from" <SourceBind> {"," <SourceBind> }
5 <WhereClause> ::= "where" <Expression>
6 <OrderByClause> ::= "order" "by" <Expression> [ "asc" | "desc" ]
7 <LimitClause> ::= "limit" number
8 <SourceBind> ::= identifier "as" identifier
9 <Expression> ::= ...
As we can see from Listing 1.3, the syntax for Ukulele queries is very similar to the “Select”
statement from the SQL language. The Ukulele “Select” statement consists of the following clauses:
select, from, where, order by, and limit. Only the select and from clauses are required, the others
are optional clauses. We also like to highlight that Ukulele similarly to SQL is also case-insensitive.
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Unlike SQL, the Ukulele “Select” statement does not have a group by clause. Although we have plans
to support a group by clause in the future, the current version does not allow the usage of such clause.
In the from clause of Ukulele, we need to use a collection. In Ukulele, a collection is a semantic
representation of queried data. The Ukulele language have four predefined collections: ethereum.blocks,
ethereum.transactions, ethereum.accounts, and ethereum.contracts. Each one of those collections rep-
resents all first-class elements from a particular type (blocks, transactions, accounts, or contracts). We
can use ‘eth’ as an alias for ‘ethereum’. It is possible to create custom collections from a subset of
another one by creating “views” similar to SQL (Listing 1.4). Just like SQL that views can be used in
place of a table in the from clause, so does Ukulele views and collections.
Listing 1.4: Ukulele View Grammar in EBNF format
1 <View> ::= "create" ( "view" | "collection" ) identifier "as"
2 "(" <SelectStatement> ")"
Ukulele already has a predefined structure of objects to act as a container for collection items. For
example, when we retrieve information from a collection of blocks, the result will be presented as
block objects. Therefore, each object type has attributes related to their storage structure (i.e., a block
object will have different attributes than a transaction object). The attributes available for each object
type are the following:
• Block: number, hash, parentHash, parent, nonce, timestamp, size, miner, difficulty, totalDiffi-
culty, gasLimit, gasUsed, extraData, transactionsRoot, transactionsHashes, transactions, amountOf-
Transactions, uncleHashes, uncles.
• Transaction: hash, nonce, blockHash, blockNumber, block, transactionIndex, fromAddress,
from, toAddress, to, value, gasPrice, gas, input, timestamp.
• Account: address, name, balance.
• Contract: descriptions, instances.
– Contract.Instance: address, name, balance, binaryHash, bytecode.
For a more detailed description of each attribute, see our first publication on EQL [BRDD18a].
One major improvement over EQL is handling contracts. For example, we can use contracts’ internal
attributes or functions in Ukulele queries. Moreover, we can handle the general structure of a contract
(by using the contract object) or the deployed instances (the instances attribute of a contract object).
Internally, our implementation of Ukulele relies on indexes to increase its performance when
querying data. Since each access to the blockchain to fetch data is a remote call, any form of opti-
mization can improve the time required to acquire and present data. An index is a summarization of
data stored into a structure that improves the performance of retrieval operations. The basic idea is to
allow a more efficient search into the database. In our particular case, we index blockchain data (e.g.,
blocks, transactions) with its related hash to speed up fetching data.
For Ukulele, we implemented a Binary Search Tree (BST) to serve as the index structure. The
BST employs a two-dimensional array where the first dimension of each entry is used for storing
the property value, and the second dimension is used for storing a set of hashes to the elements
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that correspond to this specific value. We chose this implementation because of its simplicity for
selecting an interval of indexes in any comparison operation, such as “greater than”, “lesser than”. We
acknowledge that BST has a high storage requirement. However, we wanted a simple and fast solution
to our first implementation of Ukulele. Moreover, Ukulele builds these internal indexes automatically,
without the need for user interaction. On the other hand, Ukulele also supports that users create their
own custom indexes, to speed up queries. The syntax to create custom indexes is similar to SQL
(Listing 1.5).
Listing 1.5: Ukulele Custom Index Grammar in EBNF format
1 <Index> ::= "create" ["unique"] "index" identifier "on" identifier "(" identifier
")"
1.5.3 Illustrative Example
For this example, we will show some of the new features of Ukulele (i.e., contract querying). Let’s
suppose a smart contract that handles the selling of a product. The following listing shows the essential
code parts for the product contract.
Listing 1.6: Solidity Product Contract Example
31 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
32 /** @title Product Contract Example
33 * @author RMoD-Blockchain Team
34 */
35 contract RmodProduct {
36 /* Type Definition */
37 enum State {ON_SALE, WAITING_SEND, RECEIVED, FINISH }
38
39 /* Attributes */
40 State private state = State.ON_SALE;
41 address private owner;
42 address private buyer;
43 uint private price;
44 string private itemName;
45
46 /* Constructor */
47 constructor(string _name, uint _price) public {
48 owner = msg.sender; itemName = _name; price = _price;
49 }
50
51 /* Functions */
52 // Returns the this product information (name,price)
53 function getInfo() public view returns(string,uint) { ... }
54 // Buys this product
55 function buy() payable public { ... }
56 // Inform the seller/owner the product was properly received
57 function received() public { ... }
58 // Completes the sale, the owner terminate the contract and get the money
59 function terminate() public { ... }
60 }
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As we can see, the above contract (Listing 1.6) can be used to sell any product. In our example,
the user only wants to query only on these product contracts. Therefore, he/she creates a view for this
task (Listing 1.7). The “binaryHash” attribute of an instance is an MD5 hash of the contract’s binary
structured. Thus, by using this attribute someone can get all contracts with the same internal structure.
In this case, the view query (Listing 1.7) is getting only RmodProduct contracts (Listing 1.6).
Listing 1.7: Ukulele Create View Example
1 CREATE VIEW RmodProductContracts (
2 SELECT instance
3 FROM eth.contract.instances AS instance
4 WHERE instance.binaryHash = ’4d3c0777436de51258c7ba6c235a2e52’
5 );
Now, the user can employ the view to more easily query only product contracts. In this example
(Listing 1.8), the user wants cheap products that are still up for sale.
Listing 1.8: Ukulele Contract Query Example
1 SELECT instance.itemName, instance.price, instance.state
2 FROM RmodProductContracts AS instance
3 WHERE instance.price < 40 AND instance.state = ’ON_SALE’;
Figure 1.6 shows the results from the above query.
Figure 1.6: Ukulele Contract Query Example Results
Ukulele can also execute contract functions. Besides using functions for querying values, this
feature can be used to execute a function that changes the contract state in a batch. For example, let’s
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suppose a user who wants to collect the sales on his products. Without Ukulele, the user would have
to execute the function ‘terminate’ on each contract manually and one at the time. Using Ukulele, the
same user can just write a simple query (Listing 1.9).
Listing 1.9: Ukulele Block Query Example
1 SELECT instance.itemName, instance.terminate()
2 FROM RmodProductContracts AS instance
3 WHERE instance.owner = ’0xca35b7d915458ef540ade6068dfe2f44e8fa733c’
4 AND instance.state = ’RECEIVED’;
1.5.4 Evaluation
We compared Ukulele against Presto and Web3, on the supported features designed for acquiring data
in the blockchain. The features we analyzed were the following:
• Query Language: the implementation offers a query language to specify the data you want to
fetch. Lack of a query language can make it more difficult to acquire complex information.
• Group Functions: the implementation supports the use of aggregate (group by) functions.
Lack of group functions limits transformation on the data and what it is possible to acquire.
• Join Data: checks whether it allows different data sources to be joined. Ideally, it should allow
merging data from different platforms as well (e.g., blockchain and No-SQL).
• Views: indicate if the implementation supports the definition of views or some similar feature.
Views allow the user to save his queried data for later usage.
• Tool Support: see if there is a tool support to specify, check, and show the acquired data as
well as the commands used to fetch such data. Lack of tool support can hinder the adoption of
the implementation.
• Data Source: checks if the implementation can fetch any type of first-class elements stored in
the blockchain.
Table 1.2: Related techniques comparison
Feature Ukulele Presto Web3
Query Language Yes Yes No
Group Functions No Yes No
Join Data Partial Yes No
Views Yes No No
Tool Support No No No
Data Source All Partial All
Web3 is the official Ethereum API coded in Javascript that implements an interface to the Remote
Procedure Call (RPC) protocol [Eth18a]. Web3 is not a query language, all data is gathered by using
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its API interface. Even though Web3 can access any data stored in Ethereum, it can only fetch by
direct and sequential access. Therefore, the user must search the information manually among the
collected data. Although not a very polished solution to gather data, Web3 and its underlying protocol
is the basis to access Ethereum data. Both Ukulele and Presto use Web3 (or another related API) to
access the blockchain platform and perform its search.
Presto is a querying engine to run SQL on other platforms, including Ethereum blockchain. More-
over, Presto supports full SQL syntax for querying such as joins, group functions, etc. However, it
does not support another auxiliary syntax such as views. There is no tool support to edit queries or
view the results. Another flaw in Presto is that it can only acquire Ethereum data related to Blocks
and Transactions. Therefore, Presto cannot show information on contracts or accounts.
Ukulele is a query language implemented to automate searching for information in Ethereum. As
we previously mentioned, Ukulele is still under development and the current version does not support
group functions. Moreover, the current version of Ukulele is able to join multiple data sources from
Ethereum but it is not possible to merge such data with different platforms (such as NoSQL). There
is no tool support for Ukulele, although one is currently under development. The major advantage the
Ukulele has over Presto is that Ukulele can fetch any data from Ethereum first-class elements (blocks,
transactions, contracts, and accounts).
1.5.5 Related Work
In this section, we discuss some related work on blockchain research focused on search and naviga-
tion. Tools and implementations (e.g., Presto) that were not originated by research are not presented
here.
Morishima and Matsutani [MM18] propose a new way to search for blockchain information by
using GPUs. They argue that blockchain full nodes could turn into a bottleneck for the platform if the
search performance is not improved. The authors evaluate the performance of their approach against
the existing practice and other methods; and conclude that their proposal throughput is 3.4. times
higher than the second highest approach. Although the work of Morishima and Matsutani is about
searching blockchain data, it has a different purpose than Ukulele. Ukulele was designed to help
users search for complex data. On the other hand, Morishima and Matsutani designed their approach
to improve the performance of searching for data in blockchain nodes. The similarity is that both
research deals with the internal structure of the blockchain and searching for data in that platform.
Ruta et al. [RSI+17] discuss a new semantic-enhanced layer for blockchain platforms focusing
on the supply chain application domain. They propose a framework for on-line object discovery
to implement their layer on a Hyperledger blockchain. Their approach adopts a semantic matching
between queries and objects, which allows users to find supply chain information more easily. Unlike
Ukulele, there is no query language. However, it does use semantic information to fetch blockchain
information. Ukulele provides a rich syntax for querying information, but it does not use semantic-
enhanced objects and information to improve the search.
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1.6 Discussion and Related Work
In this section, we discuss our future research and tools and then we present related work on blockchain
analysis platforms and tool suites.
1.6.1 Future research and tool development
As a platform SmartAnvil should support a large range of analysis. We are focusing on the foundations
of the tools. We see the following topics as the next components around SmartAnvil.
Metrics. It is not possible to control what you do not measure; and such statement is the basic
wisdom on why we need to use metrics [Hev97]. Metrics are useful to assess the internal quality of a
software as well as the productivity of the development team. Since the 90s, there has been a plethora
of proposed software metrics [LH93, CK94, LK94, HM95, BMB96, Hev97, TNM08]. The reason
for so many different metrics is because specific domains or characteristics require measurements
tailored for its particular needs. Usually, applying a metric designed for one domain to another leads
to mismatch or incompatibility. For instance, the domain mismatch led to procedural programming
metrics to be adapted for the object-oriented paradigm.
Due to the extremely fast growing pace of smart contract usage, in this new software paradigm
measuring code quality is becoming as essential as in out-of-chain software development. However,
traditional software metrics do not capture the specific aspects of smart contracts. Therefore, we need
metrics designed for smart contracts.
Gas Estimation. In the Ethereum platform, any transaction that changes the internal state of a con-
tract is charged a special resource called Gas [Eth18c]. The name was inspired by the view that this
resource is the fuel for running contracts [Eth16]. Therefore, Gas units correspond to the execution
of computation instructions. The idea is to avoid infinite loops (and the halting problem), encourage
efficient code, and make users pay for the computation resource they used.
Even though the unused gas is refunded back to the user, optimize this resource is the key to have
a transaction approved quickly. Since the Miner is awarded the used gas cost, he/she will prefer to
mine transactions that optimize his/her gains. In this context, a better estimation of the gas by the user
may encourage Miners to process such user’s transaction.
Estimate how many gas units a contract function is going to require is not a simple task. The
Remix IDE gives an estimate if the function does not contain loops or external calls. Consequently,
Remix is not reliable to estimate gas on any function. Therefore, we require better estimation tools to
assess the amount of gas consumption.
Security Recommendations. The number of smart contracts is growing at a fast rate, and develop-
ers are not yet accustomed to code in this new environment. Bad programming practices in a smart
contract can turn into terrible security flaws [DMO+18]. For example, the infamous “DAO attack”
was caused by insecure coding practices on the contract that allowed an attacker to drain approxi-
mately 50 million dollars worth of cyptocurreny [LCO+16, TVI+18]. As an analogy, we can think
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of web applications that had SQL-injections flaws, which would be simple to avoid if developers
designed and adopted a more secure coding practice.
Most security flaws in smart contracts can be traced to poor coding that could be avoided if the
developer had a better expertise with the environment and the programming language. A simple and
elegant way to give such expertise to developers is to create a recommendation system that warns
developers of problematic code and suggests a better way to accomplish the same program. In this
context, we claim it is important to give security recommendations for contract developers.
Dashboard. To make all the information gathered by future tools useful in practice, care has to be
taken to create presentations that target both developers and even other stakeholders like management
and customers. We plan to explore how Dashboards can support both viewing data and defining
conditions that should automatically notify developers in case of problems [Few06].
1.6.2 Related work
In this section, we discuss related work on blockchain analysis platforms and tools.
Porru et al. [PPMT17] acknowledge the need to develop specialized tools and techniques for
blockchain-oriented software (BOS). The authors define the term BOS as a software that interacts
with blockchain. The authors describe issues and challenges faced when working with blockchain
from a software engineering point-of-view: new professional roles, security and reliability, software
architecture and metamodels, modeling languages, and metrics. They also analyze 1,184 GitHub
projects using blockchain, and they propose new ideas and practices to improve the state-of-art on
BOS. The authors present interesting research possibilities that inspired several components on the
SmartAnvil platform.
Bartoletti et al. [BLPB17] propose a framework for blockchain analytics coded as a Scala library.
Their framework works on both Ethereum and BitCoin platform and it employs a general-purpose
abstraction layer to promote reuse. One great feature of the authors’ framework is the ability to
integrate data from other sources besides blockchain, such as a NoSQL database. The authors contrast
their framework features against five other tools, but they do not conduct a performance comparison.
This work is interesting because the authors combine blockchain data with a secondary database.
Unlike SmartAnvil, their framework does not support querying or analysis of contracts, only blocks,
and transactions. Moreover, the query language is a specific syntax based on a Scala API and it is not
as popular as SQL-based queries. Finally, their framework focus only on gathering data and does not
support other tools such as inspection or static analysis.
Kalodner et al. [KGC+17] implement an open-source blockchain analysis platform, called BlockSci.
They designed their platform with a specific concern for performance by using an in-memory database
and actual pointers instead of hash linkage. For instance, the authors’ claim it is 15 to 600 times faster
than other tools. They support the following blockchains: BitCoin, LiteCoin, Namecoin, and Zcash.
The authors focus their analysis on financial transactions. Therefore their analysis is not well pol-
ished for blocks and it specifically does not support smart contracts. This contrast with SmartAnvil
platform, which was designed to help smart contract developers as well as providing tools for other
first-class elements (such as transactions and blocks).
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Etherscan (https://etherscan.io) is also an analytics platform connected to the Ethereum platform
and providing on-the-fly blockchain information on accounts, contracts, transactions, blocks, etc.
Similarly to SmartAnvil, Etherscan also has an inspector and other tools to interact with Ethereum.
Etherscan does not have a query language but it supports simple search on blockchain elements.
Although Etherscan is free to use, it is not open source. Therefore, it is not possible to extend any
Etherscan features or components. Unlike SmartAnvil which is open source to encourage developers
to contribute to improving our tools.
Remix [Eth18b] is an open source suite of tools developed by the Ehtereum Foundation. Although
Remix is mostly recognized for its IDE component, it does provide many other tools such as inspec-
tion, transaction debugger, gas estimation, etc. Since it is developed by the Ethereum Foundation,
Remix is always integrated with the latest Ethereum APIs. Remix is coded in JavaScript and it is
under the MIT open source license. SmartAnvil shares some similar tools with Remix (e.g., inspec-
tor, parser). However, both suites have distinguished tools that are absent on the other. For instance,
SmartAnvil have a query language, a smart graph, and integration with Moose. On the other hand,
Remix has a transactional debugger and a full IDE.
There are tools designed to improve the security of smart contracts. Oyente [LCO+16] is a tool
that flags potential security flaws on smart contracts. Oyente uses static analysis on the contract
binary code to make security recommendations. SmartCheck [TVI+18] is another tool using static
analysis that identifies unsecured patterns on contracts source code and warns the user with better
practices. Bhargavan et al. [BDLF+16] proposed an unnamed framework to convert smart contract
to their own functional language F*, which was design to better verify the correctness and security
of smart contracts. Although SmartAnvil does not support security verification or recommendation
of smart contracts, this is important for smart contract developers and we plan to add a tool for such
tasks in the future.
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a set of analysis tools showcasing our SmartAnvil platform to cover
different aspects of smart contracts analysis. For each tool, we showed the importance of each, and
the main challenges when developing them.
First, we presented the basic tool to support static code representation of Solidity smart contracts,
our parser SmaCC-Solidity. By having full control over our parser and its representation allows us
to avoid any problems by future changes on the Solidity language (which is not stable). The parser
is used on other SmartAnvil tools such as SmartInspect, and SmartMetrics. Developers can use this
parser to increase the integration between Solidity and Pharo by implementing more tool support; or
build their own static analysis tools on the resulting AST.
Second, we showed SmartInspect, our internal state inspector for Solidity smart contracts. As
we explained, contracts are opaque because once deployed it is very difficult to see their runtime
state defined by their internal attributes. SmartInspect can pierce through the opaqueness and show to
developers the live state of their own contracts while assuring a level of privacy that few other tools
support. The inspector can see the contents of any contract instance of the given source code, without
needing to redeploy, nor develop any ad-hoc code to fetch the information. Contract inspection can
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aid developers to better understand their contracts and even find bugs more easily.
Third, we presented Ukulele, a query language that allows users to retrieve information from the
blockchain by writing SQL-like queries. This tool automates the task of sequentially searching into
generic opaque structures, and provides an easier way to specify the information we want to acquire
in a higher abstraction level. Ukulele distinguishes itself to be able to search through all first class
elements such as blocks, transactions, accounts, and contracts. Other tools usually cannot search
contract instances, leaving potential useful information behind. On the other hand, Ukulele is even
able to call contract functions inside its queries.
For future work, we plan to extend the platform with more tools such as: (i) improved metrics suite
(our current SmartMetrics tools still needs improvement); (ii) gas estimation of contract functions; (iii)
recommendation system to suggest secure programming practices; (iv) a dashboard to facilitate the
usage and interaction with blockchain and smart contracts.
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[CNSG15] Andrei Chiş, Oscar Nierstrasz, Aliaksei Syrel, and Tudor Gîrba. The moldable inspector.
In 2015 ACM International Symposium on New Ideas, New Paradigms, and Reflections
on Programming and Software (Onward!), Onward! 2015, pages 44–60, New York, NY,
USA, 2015. ACM.
[DMO+18] Giuseppe Destefanis, Michele Marchesi, Marco Ortu, Roberto Tonelli, Andrea Brac-
ciali, and Robert M. Hierons. Smart contracts vulnerabilities: a call for blockchain
software engineering? In 2018 International Workshop on Blockchain Oriented Soft-
ware Engineering, IWBOSE@SANER 2018, Campobasso, Italy, March 20, 2018, pages
19–25, 2018.
[EN10] Ramez Elmasri and Shamkant Navathe. Fundamentals of Database Systems. Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, USA, 6th edition, 2010.
[Eth14] Ethereum Foundation. Ethereum’s white paper., 2014.
[Eth16] Ethereum Community. Ethereum homestead documentation, 2016.
[Eth18a] Ethereum Foundation. Json rpc, 2018.
[Eth18b] Ethereum Foundation. Remix documentation release 1., 2018.
https://remix.readthedocs.io/en/latest.
[Eth18c] Ethereum Foundation. Solidity documentation release 0.4.24, 2018.
[Few06] S. Few. Information Dashboard Design. OReilly, 2006.
[Hev97] A.R. Hevner. Phase containment metrics for software quality improvement. Information
and Software Technology, 39(13):867 – 877, 1997.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 29
[HM95] M. Hitz and B. Montazeri. Measure coupling and cohesion in object-oriented systems.
Proceedings of International Symposium on Applied Corporate Computing (ISAAC ’95),
October 1995.
[IM15] Chinawat Isradisaikul and Andrew C. Myers. Finding counterexamples from parsing
conflicts. In 36th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation, PLDI ’15, pages 555–564, New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[KGC+17] H. Kalodner, S. Goldfeder, A. Chator, M. Möser, and A. Narayanan. Blocksci: Design
and applications of a blockchain analysis platform. ArXiv e-prints, sep 2017. «««<
Updated upstream =======
[KLR13] Jan Kurš, Guillaume Larcheveque, and Lukas Renggli. PetitParser: Building modular
parsers. In Deep Into Pharo, page 36. Square Bracket Associates, September 2013. »»»>
Stashed changes
[LBGD18] Jason Lecerf, John Brant, Thierry Goubier, and Stéphane Ducasse. A reflexive and
automated approach to syntactic pattern matching in code transformations. In IEEE
International Conference on Software Maintenance and Evolution (ICSME’18), Madrid,
Spain, September 2018.
[LCO+16] Loi Luu, Duc-Hiep Chu, Hrishi Olickel, Prateek Saxena, and Aquinas Hobor. Making
smart contracts smarter. In CCS’2016 (ACM Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security), 2016.
[LH93] W. Li and S. Henry. Object oriented metrics that predict maintainability. Journal of
System Software, 23(2):111–122, 1993.
[LK94] Mark Lorenz and Jeff Kidd. Object-Oriented Software Metrics: A Practical Guide.
Prentice-Hall, 1994.
[LKG07] Adrian Lienhard, Adrian Kuhn, and Orla Greevy. Rapid prototyping of visualizations
using mondrian. In Proceedings IEEE International Workshop on Visualizing Software
for Understanding, Vissoft’07, pages 67–70, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, June 2007. IEEE
Computer Society.
[Mer93] Gary Merrill. Parsing non-lr(k) grammars with yacc. Software Practice and Experience,
2(8):829–850, 1993.
[Mil05] Ashley Mills. Antlr tutorial, 2005.
[MM18] S. Morishima and H. Matsutani. Accelerating blockchain search of full nodes us-
ing gpus. In 26th Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and
Network-based Processing (PDP), pages 244–248, mar 2018.
[NA05] Oscar Nierstrasz and Franz Achermann. Separating concerns with first-class names-
paces. In Robert E. Filman, Tzilla Elrad, Siobhán Clarke, and Mehmet Aksit, editors,
Aspect-Oriented Software Development, pages 243–259. Addison-Wesley, 2005.
30 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[PBB07] Leonardo Teixeira Passos, Mariza A. S. Bigonha, and Roberto S. Bigonha. A methodol-
ogy for removing lalr(k) conflicts. Journal of Universal Computer Science, 13(6):737–
752, jun 2007.
[PBD+15] Nick Papoulias, N. Bouraqadi, Marcus Denker, Stéphane Ducasse, and Luc Fabresse.
Mercury: Properties and design of a remote debugging solution using reflection. Journal
of Object Technology, 2015.
[PPMT17] S. Porru, A. Pinna, M. Marchesi, and R. Tonelli. Blockchain-oriented software engineer-
ing: challenges and new directions. In Proceedings of the 39th International Conference
on Software Engineering Companion, pages 169–171, 2017.
[RDDL17] Henrique Rocha, Stéphane Ducasse, Marcus Denker, and Jason Lecerf. Solidity parsing
using smacc: Challenges and irregularities. In Proceedings of the 12th Edition of the In-
ternational Workshop on Smalltalk Technologies, IWST ’17, pages 2:1–2:9, New York,
NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
[RSI+17] Michele Ruta, Floriano Scioscia, Saverio Ieva, Giovanna Capurso, and Eugenio Di Sci-
ascio. Supply chain object discovery with semantic-enhanced blockchain. In Proceed-
ings of the 15th ACM Conference on Embedded Network Sensor Systems, SenSys ’17,
pages 60:1–60:2, New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
[SKS11] Abraham Silberschatz, Henry Korth, and S. Sudarshan. Database Systems Concepts.
McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 6th edition, 2011.
[SM16] Guido Salvaneschi and Mira Mezini. Debugging reactive programming with reactive
inspector. In Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Software Engineering
Companion, ICSE ’16, pages 728–730, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
[SR14] Venkatesh Srinivasan and Thomas Reps. Recovery of Class Hierarchies and Compo-
sition Relationships from Machine Code, pages 61–84. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2014.
[TDMO18] R. Tonelli, G. Destefanis, M. Marchesi, and M. Ortu. Smart contracts software metrics:
a first study. ArXiv e-prints, feb 2018.
[TNM08] Ewan Tempero, James Noble, and Hayden Melton. How do java programs use inheri-
tance? an empirical study of inheritance in java software. In ECOOP ’08: Proceedings
of the 22nd European conference on Object-Oriented Programming, pages 667–691,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
[TVI+18] S. Tikhomirov, E. Voskresenskaya, I. Ivanitskiy, R. Takhaviev, E. Marchenko, and
Y. Alexandrov. Smartcheck: Static analysis of ethereum smart contracts. In 2018
IEEE/ACM 1st International Workshop on Emerging Trends in Software Engineering
for Blockchain (WETSEB), pages 9–16, may 2018.
